A scientific critique of the two-degree climate change target by Knutti, R. et al.
1Government representatives are meeting once again at the international climate talks in Paris in December 2015, with the aim of deciding on new steps towards preventing danger-
ous man-made climate change. Much of the disagreement among 
the parties can be linked to differing national priorities and burden 
sharing — that is, how much each country has to contribute to a 
solution, for example, in terms of emission reductions, financial and 
technological support, or in compensation payments for loss and 
damages. The means with which to restrict warming to below the 
2 °C limit are not the only issues discussed in policy circles1,2 and by 
the public3,4, the adequacy of the target itself is also debated.
The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), established back in 
1992, is “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-
phere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system”5. But it neither specifies what 
concentration level that would be, nor how to assess what is “dan-
gerous”. Following the Copenhagen Accord in 2009, the UNFCCC 
formally decided in 2012 to pursue actions in line with a 2 °C global 
temperature increase target6. This target was a political decision 
informed by science, but no scientific assessment ever defended or 
recommended a particular target. Policymakers like to hide behind 
scientific evidence7, ask for ‘actionable science’ and claim to make 
‘science-based decisions’. Some argue that this process “has more in 
common with a salad bar — where people pick and choose conveni-
ent studies — than with the balanced search for truth that science 
aspires to”8.
Ultimately, the 2  °C target is a political consensus that takes 
into account what policymakers at that time considered to be both 
realistically achievable and tolerable. It is high time for a scien-
tific assessment of the question whether global mean temperature 
is a meaningful quantity, and if so, how science can contribute to 
deciding what level most appropriately reflects the UNFCCC’s 
ultimate objective.
Global temperature as a target
A meaningful target for limiting warming must, first and foremost, 
be clearly related to what should be achieved. In addition, it needs 
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to be observed with sufficient accuracy, both today and back in 
the past; a robust understanding is required of how humans have 
affected the level of warming so far and how we can control it; and 
finally it should be easy to communicate.
Global mean surface temperature largely meets these require-
ments: its relationship to climate impacts at the global scale is 
complex, but undisputed. For more than a century, global mean 
temperatures have been well observed. Temperature changes since 
the industrial revolution are mostly attributable to the burning of 
fossil fuels and we have a robust understanding of additional causes 
of past trends in global temperatures as well as of their temporal 
and spatial variability. Finally, global temperature change is approxi-
mately linearly related to the total anthropogenic CO2 emitted since 
the industrial revolution, and is therefore directly linked to human 
action. However, a long-term surface temperature target does not 
capture ocean acidification, rates of change or the energy uptake of 
the whole planet, for example.
There are many other possible targets, such as limits to atmos-
pheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations, energy uptake, sea-
level rise, ocean acidification, rates of temperature change, regional 
climate change, specific unacceptable local impacts, avoidance of 
tipping points such as the loss of the Greenland ice sheet, emission 
reductions in a particular year, timing of global zero emissions, or 
even economic quantities such as the cost of impacts (see Box 1 for 
an assessment of some quantities). Indeed any other quantity, or a 
combination of several quantities9, could in principle be considered 
as a target. But the more local and the more specific the formula-
tion of targets, the higher the uncertainty in future projections and 
the poorer their historical observational record. Finally, even local 
targets require aggregation to become actionable at the global level. 
Combining multiple targets is possible but opens another debate on 
which targets to pick, and how to weigh or combine them.
In terms of alternative temperature-based targets, rates of change 
in global surface temperature have been discussed10,11, for example, 
because adaptation of infrastructure is generally easier and less 
costly with more time, and ecosystems might be able to shift their 
habitats if the climate changes more slowly. Rates of change over 
short periods are strongly affected by natural climate variability12, 
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so setting an upper bound for those is problematic. Limiting longer-
term trends is an option that, maybe unjustifiably so, has not gotten 
much attention so far. Minimizing rates of change would also favour 
rapid mitigation.
In summary, global surface temperature is the indicator that 
meets most of the requirements for a climate target, and it has 
already garnered widespread support. One potential drawback is 
that the baseline — pre-industrial conditions — is poorly defined. 
‘Pre-industrial’ in the IPCC13 assessments refers to 1750, yet there is 
no instrumental record of global temperature before about 1850, and 
CO2 emissions, in particular from land use and land-use changes, 
are poorly known. Setting a different base period, for example, 
1850–1900, would make sense scientifically. However, applying a 
different base period affects how historical emissions are accounted 
for in a country’s total (referred to as historical responsibility), and 
is therefore debated.
Global warming and local climate change impacts
A change in global temperature does not translate into local impacts 
in a straightforward manner. Similarly, criteria for judging whether 
a local change constitutes ‘dangerous interference’ are not obvious.
Large-scale patterns of surface warming — and as a conse-
quence, many other variables — scale approximately linearly with 
the magnitude of global mean surface temperature change14, with 
slight deviations when the system approaches equilibrium. Similar 
changes in the physical system occur earlier for higher GHG emis-
sion rates15 (Fig. 1). Aggregated quantities, such as the relative change 
of global precipitation, scale remarkably linearly with temperature 
(Fig.  2a). Even the large-scale changes in some extreme weather 
events, for example, the warming of the hottest days or the increase 
in the magnitude of heavy precipitation, scale approximately with 
mean temperature.
As a result, however, the number of events exceeding a threshold 
generally increases non-linearly. For example, the number of very 
hot days exceeding a percentile-based threshold increases globally 
about six-fold for a 1 °C-warmer world, but more than 20-fold for a 
2 °C-warmer world16 (Fig. 2b). In cases where physiological thresh-
olds play a role (for example, public health, plants or ecosystems), 
the impacts are therefore likely to be strongly nonlinear. Indeed, this 
is a general feature of many impacts: damages from storms, floods, 
droughts, and so on. Such impacts are typically small for moder-
ate events and then increase rapidly. There are also important limits 
to adaptation; at 4 °C the impact risk is much higher than at 2 °C, 
but the potential for risk reduction through adaptation is not much 
higher at 4 °C than at 2 °C (ref. 17).
Some changes may be abrupt in time, or exhibit threshold behav-
iour as a function of equilibrium temperature. Long-term sea-level 
rise at multi-centennial timescales, and the damage and cost asso-
ciated with it, for example, is likely to be much larger above 2 °C as 
a result of the potential disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet 
(Fig. 2c). Sea-ice cover in the whole Northern Hemisphere scales 
approximately with temperature18, but locally, abrupt and large 
changes are possible (Fig.  2d), partly as a result of large natural 
variability superimposed on a long-term trend. Large-scale tipping 
points and thresholds in the climate itself (for example, a dieback 
of the Amazon rainforests, a collapse of the Atlantic Meridional 
Overturning Circulation, a shift in monsoon systems or the release 
of methane from hydrates) cannot be excluded. In general there 
is a better understanding of the consequences of crossing such 
thresholds than where exactly these thresholds may be13.
Aggregated globally, most changes in the physical climate system 
are unlikely to be strongly nonlinear below a warming of 4 °C, but 
the impacts and risks probably are (Fig. 2e, ref. 17). Small changes 
locally may even be beneficial, for example, for agriculture, but 
impacts and damage costs increase rapidly for high levels of warm-
ing. On the other hand, mitigation costs increase rapidly towards 
low temperature targets. Impacts at different levels of climate 
change vary widely in character, time and space and are loaded with 
major uncertainties.
In our view, the current 2  °C UNFCCC target is a compro-
mise between what is deemed possible and desirable, rather than 
a “planetary boundary”20,21 that clearly separates a ‘safe’ from a 
‘dangerous’ world.
One major challenge is that a warming of 2 °C sounds like a small 
change and conveys no sense of urgency to the non-expert, and 
quantifying its local implications is fraught with uncertainties. Even 
relatively straightforward variables such as local temperatures and 
precipitation vary widely across all land areas for a global 2 °C level, 
with local annual mean warming up to 5 °C, and local precipitation 
changes exceeding the range from –20 to +30%.
Uncertainties also increase towards stronger climate change 
both globally22 and locally, illustrated for the water cycle in Fig. 3. It 
shows the land fraction experiencing a trend towards wetter and 
drier conditions in precipitation (P), evaporation (E), E–P, soil 
moisture, runoff and atmospheric relative humidity combined. For 
a warming of 1  °C globally, about 30% of the land area and vari-
ables show a consistent change across the latest set of climate model 
simulations (Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5, 
CMIP5); for about 50% of the land the changes are within natural 
variability, and for about 20% of the land the models show signifi-
cant changes but disagree on the sign or magnitude, with potentially 
unknown impacts and risks. For a warming of 3 °C, that fraction of 
land with unknown risks more than doubles to about 50% mostly 
at the expense of the area with no significant change. While there 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. An early proposed 
target was stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations52–54, 
and some still advocate such a target (for example, the non-
governmental movement 350.org). GHG concentrations are 
well-observed, however, impacts do not track them closely. 
Temperature and therefore impacts would continue to change 
for many decades even under constant atmospheric GHG con-
centrations. Different GHGs have different sources and lifetimes 
and would need to be aggregated. The warming in response to 
GHGs is uncertain, and other local forcings (from aerosols or 
land use) also affect the climate. Radiative forcing as an aggre-
gated quantity of all radiatively active species avoids some of 
these issues, but is a model-derived quantity that cannot directly 
be measured.
Global energy uptake. An attractive quantity from a physical 
point of view would be global energy uptake by the entire cli-
mate system, rather than just the atmosphere. More than 90% of 
the net energy uptake of the planet ends up in the oceans, leav-
ing only a small fraction in the atmosphere. But observational 
estimates of global ocean heat content are short and loaded with 
uncertainty, particularly before the 2000s. Warming of the entire 
ocean depth is also delayed by hundreds of years relative to the 
surface and is largely unrelated to impacts on land.
Global sea-level rise. The thermal expansion of seawater and 
the melting of ice sheets and glaciers leads to global sea-level 
rise. As a result of the long timescales in the disintegration of the 
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, sea level would continue to 
increase for thousands of years even with constant or declining 
surface temperatures, making its link to other impacts weak. In 
addition, uncertainties in long-term sea-level rise are still very 
large, which reduces its usefulness as a target metric. 
Box 1 | Alternative target quantities.
3is relatively good agreement on some changes in the hydrological 
cycle — for example, mean and heavy precipitation22,23 — changes in 
soil moisture, droughts and runoff are very uncertain24.
The main challenges for science are to map out more quantita-
tively what the local impact of a global 2  °C warming would be, 
how that differs from 1.5 °C or 2.5 °C, how these impacts change 
over time, and what could be avoided by adaptation at what cost. 
The main challenge for society is to agree on what risks are accept-
able and which are to be avoided. Those risks are inherently local 
and sector-specific, and poorly reflected in summary figures such as 
the “reasons for concern”25 (Fig. 2e). Second, local decision-makers 
need to aggregate local risks to a global actionable target that can be 
discussed at the global scale. This discussion has important ethical 
dimensions: if the risk is high in some places and low in others, can 
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Figure 1 | Projected climate change for different global mean temperature targets. 20 year average annual mean surface temperature and precipitation 
change for a warming of 1.5 °C, 2 °C, or 4 °C relative to 1870–1889 in the CMIP5 models. Stippling implies significant changes that are robust across 
models, the hatching indicates changes within natural variability and white areas mark inconsistent model responses (see Methods). 
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‘reasons for concern’ at a global scale assessed by the IPCC (data from ref. 17). 
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we simply take a global average, accepting that half will live danger-
ously? Should we alternatively avoid all the risks, in which case we 
probably have already passed the safe limit?
Timescales and reversibility
It is unclear whether temperature targets should be interpreted as 
a threshold that must not be exceeded, or as an eventual long-term 
goal, in which case it may be exceeded temporarily. Exceeding a 
temperature threshold occurs if emissions are not reduced quickly 
enough (either for political and technological reasons, or because 
the climate response to forcing is higher than currently expected), 
or if at some point the agreed target is reduced. A warming of 1.5 °C 
for example is unlikely to be achievable without an overshoot given 
historical and current trends in CO2 emissions2 and climate. This 
raises the issue of reversibility of climate change and impacts.
The climate responds to emissions on many timescales. Initially, 
surface warming approximately follows accumulated CO2 emis-
sions, and water vapour, lapse rate, albedo and cloud feedbacks 
approximately scale with temperature. But on timescales of many 
centuries, additional feedbacks due to vegetation changes, or melt-
ing ice sheets and permafrost may cause additional warming. Those 
processes are not currently simulated in most climate models, yet 
may increase the canonical equilibrium climate sensitivity, assessed 
as ‘likely’ 1.5–4.5 °C for a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration, to an Earth system sensitivity on timescales of millennia to 
6 °C or more26,27.
If CO2 emissions were stopped immediately, most of the warm-
ing and therefore impacts would persist for many centuries28. This 
‘irreversibility’ on timescales of at least hundreds of years implies 
that climate change from past emissions — even in the absence of 
future emissions — constitutes a commitment for many genera-
tions. These irreversibility concepts are often misunderstood. Some 
changes are irreversible in the sense that multiple equilibria exist 
in a dynamical system, for example, species going extinct, or the 
disappearance of the Greenland ice sheet (which may only regrow 
in climate conditions colder than today). On the other hand, most 
changes will simply persist for centuries to millennia due to the long 
lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere. Similarly, sea-level rise would 
also continue for centuries under constant surface temperatures and 
is not easily reversed29.
Despite the committed warming, the majority of future warming 
is in principle not unavoidable, as future changes are determined 
largely by future emissions, which themselves are dependent on 
current investments in infrastructure30,31. Emission reductions slow 
down the warming trends within years32. Despite the above irrevers-
ibility considerations reverting to a substantially cooler climate is 
possible in principal, but only if CO2 were to be taken actively out of 
the atmosphere and sequestered, an operation that is still far from 
common practice. The timescales involved in the climate and car-
bon cycle are similar for warming and cooling. To first order the 
warming and cooling per ton of CO2 are also similar, but the release 
of CO2 from permafrost could cause hysteresis in the system, so 
additional CO2 removal would be required to compensate for that33.
In summary, climate change is not a trial-and-error experiment 
where a given mitigation and adaptation strategy can be tested, 
and choices can easily be reverted and changed if it fails. Decisions 
made today will partly lock the world into a pathway for decades to 
centuries, because the response timescales of the climate, society, 
and in terms of infrastructure, for instance, are long34. Temperature 
in scenarios without mitigation may continue to increase beyond 
the commonly discussed 2100 time horizon, with multimetre sea-
level rise as one of the consequences. Many choices of today are 
therefore effectively resulting in irreversible consequences for the 
coming centuries.
Picking a target
Defining a climate target, and deciding who needs to do how much 
to achieve it, are normative problems that depend on values and 
world views, on arguments about fairness and on ethics. But sci-
ence can and should contribute to this discussion and point out the 
consequences of different proposals35–37.
Some of the very early work has motivated the characterization 
of a ‘safe climate’ by looking at variations in past climate38,39, and this 
historical perspective is still relevant27; a warming of more than 2 °C 
would exceed temperature levels of the past several million years, and 
would move climate outside the bounds of the epoch in which our 
society developed. A comparison with the past is relevant for natural 
systems, but not straightforward for human systems. Our technolo-
gies for reducing risks are now much more advanced than just a cen-
tury ago. On the other hand, the planet today also needs to sustain 
more than seven billion people, a number that is still growing. There 
is no doubt that unmitigated climate change will take us outside a 
climate regime that humanity has experienced. It is extremely likely 
that most of the warming since about 1950 is human-induced13, and 
it is therefore in our control to either halt it or let it go unmitigated.
The 2 °C target as a policy goal can be traced back to the early 
1990s40. The IPCC frames the discussion in terms of risk, and finds 
high risks associated with warming above 2 °C. The IPCC has also 
laid out the normative issues, but is not defending a target because its 
mandate does not allow it to be policy-prescriptive. Some individual 
scientists are more outspoken and find even the 2 °C target “utterly 
inadequate”25, or state that “it would seem difficult for the risk averse 
among us to accept anything much above that [1 °C] as the standard 
for DAI [dangerous anthropogenic interference]”41. Most of the lit-
erature, however, stops after a list of ethical dimensions and possible 
criteria, and leaves open the question of how to balance risk against 
feasibility and mitigation costs. The scientific community has been 
remarkably silent on defending specific climate targets. One reason 
is certainly that attempts to have an honest and respectful discus-
sion about climate change, even if values are made explicit8, often 
turn into an ideological fight, dominated by opinions of what needs 
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5to be done about it. Attempts to discredit scientific reputations are 
not uncommon. Whether people are concerned about and willing 
to act on climate change is largely unrelated to education and the 
availability of information, but strongly determined by the views of 
those around us with which we share close ties42.
In summary, the choice of any target is ultimately a compromise 
between costs, benefits, trade-offs, and risks, where scientific evi-
dence is combined with moral and ethical arguments — much like 
agreeing on a single speed limit on all roads. The 2  °C target is a 
‘focal point’43 or ‘anchoring device’44 that can guide climate policy. 
While there are clear thresholds in some local systems, there is lit-
tle evidence so far for a globally aggregated threshold that would 
qualify as a single planetary boundary. If it exists, we do not know 
yet at which level to expect it.
In a risk-averse approach such a lack of certainty on potentially 
catastrophic outcomes would result in even more stringent action. 
Recent assessments point out that the historic warming of less than 
1  °C has already substantially impacted most regions and sectors 
around the world, and there is overwhelming evidence that unmiti-
gated climate change would pose very high risk to both nature and 
society even with adaptive measures17 (Fig. 2e). More than one hun-
dred countries now support a 1.5  °C target2, and the most recent 
UNFCCC Structured Expert Dialogue concludes that “the ‘guardrail’ 
concept, in which up to 2 °C of warming is considered safe, is inade-
quate and would therefore be better seen as an upper limit, a defence 
line that needs to be stringently defended, while less warming would 
be preferable”45.
Progress towards the 2 °C target
The implications of the near-linear relationship between total CO2 
emissions and temperature are simple and powerful36: any temper-
ature target implies a maximum carbon budget; every ton of CO2 
emitted contributes to that, no matter where and when emitted; 
and as a consequence global emissions thus need to be near zero at 
some point to halt further warming. The G7 leaders recognized this 
in June 2015, and called for full decarbonization over the course 
of this century. This was widely regarded as an important political 
step, although from a geophysical perspective it is a trivial conse-
quence of adhering to the agreed 2 °C target. Proposals have been 
made to include the year when global net emissions become zero 
as a UNFCCC target46. Furthermore, net zero targets provide easy-
to-communicate and actionable goals46, but tracking progress over 
time remains critical.
For the 2 °C target, CO2 emission reductions of about 50–80% by 
2050 (10th to 90th percentile range relative to 2010 levels) are esti-
mated in scenarios that minimize costs over the entire twenty-first 
century (Fig. 4). Such scenarios assume perfect foresight and partici-
pation of all countries. If emission reductions are delayed in the near 
term, stronger reductions are required later. The near-term evolu-
tion of emissions has important implications for the achievability of 
the required emission reductions later47, and warming is ultimately 
affected by all carbon emissions under the pathway towards zero 
emissions. Mitigation policies and current voluntary pledges have so 
far been unsuccessful in substantially changing the projected course 
of global GHG emissions. Current annual emissions would exhaust 
the carbon budget to remain below 2 °C with greater than 66% prob-
ability in about 30 years48. Furthermore, carbon intensity (the CO2 
emissions per unit of energy produced) has increased again in the 
last decade49 — reaching near-zero carbon emissions at some point 
will require this to decline to zero, or carbon to be removed again 
from the atmosphere.
The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC recently noted 
“with grave concern the significant gap” between the emission 
reductions pledged and those required to meet the 2 °C target6. The 
world is still moving along a trajectory that can lead to 3–5  °C of 
warming by 2100, and probably more after that. The effect of so-
called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)50 
has not yet fundamentally changed this assessment (Fig. 4). Whether 
the ‘below 2 °C’ target is achievable is difficult to judge; assumptions 
about technological development, societal change and particularly 
about political will and momentum are very uncertain. Every year of 
delay will nonetheless narrow the options society can choose from to 
achieve the 2 °C goal51, and a higher burden is put on the next gen-
erations. It will increase costs, the risks of expected and unexpected 
impacts, and require technologies that could come with important 
trade-offs. A prominent example are so-called negative emission 
technologies, for example, combining bio-energy production with 
capture and sequestration of the generated CO2.
Any climate target will be reviewed and possibly revised as 
scientific understanding improves and impacts are observed. The 
Figure 4 | Historical and future global CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning and industry-related activities. The thick black line shows historical data 
until 2013 (data from ref. 48). Orange to red coloured areas represent filtered subsets of the IPCC AR5 scenario database that are in line with limiting 
warming to below 2 °C during the twenty-first century with at least 66% probability. 2 °C-compatible scenarios are filtered based on the time when they 
assume globally coordinated climate action. Lighter shading represents the minimum–maximum range. Darker shading shows the interquartile range.
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political debate about a lower target of 1.5 °C at present seems to 
be disconnected from the level of mitigation ambition expressed by 
countries. But the technology and policy instruments required for 
limiting warming to levels lower than 2 °C are likely to be similar to 
those for achieving 2 °C, so the debate around the 2 °C target should 
not prevent the world from making decisions and acting.
Proposed policies and actions have not yet managed to reverse 
past CO2 emission trends and time for avoiding dangerous levels of 
global warming is quickly running out. For the first time ever, how-
ever, developed and developing countries alike have initiated national 
processes to prepare integrated climate and development plans for 
submission to the UNFCCC. This is an encouraging sign, suggesting 
that countries are finally planning how the global transition towards 
climate protection can start, not only where it could end.
Methods
Methods and any associated references are available in the online 
version of the paper.
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Methods
Figure 1 shows CMIP5 multi-model annual mean surface tempera-
ture change and precipitation change for a 20 year period with warm-
ing of 1.5 °C under the RCP2.6 scenario, 2 °C under RCP4.5, and 4 °C 
under RCP8.5 relative to 1850–1869, for the CMIP5 models. Note 
that those simulations are transient. Equilibrium patterns may be 
slightly different but such targeted simulations do not exist for most 
models. One initial condition member from each model is used with 
equal weight. Stippling indicates regions with significant changes 
that are robust across models (R > 0.8, see ref. 22). Hatching marks 
areas where at least 80% of models indicate no significant change 
(t-test at 95% significance). White areas are where at least half of the 
models show significant changes but with poor agreement among 
models (R < 0.5). The method used is identical to that described in 
detail in ref. 22. Figure 3 uses the same criteria with non-significance 
defined as 80% of the models showing no significant change, robust 
change for R > 0.8 and model disagreement for R < 0.5, as in ref. 24, 
Fig. 3, aggregated for all variables and both seasons.
